Showing posts with label Room 151. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Room 151. Show all posts

Sunday, December 23, 2018

Four old ideas on how to build new Council Homes

Hat tip Room 151 - Sometimes the old ones are the best

"Chris Buss suggests four ways to stimulate the building of council housing.

(photo East Ham, Newham)

Earlier in the year the government issued a Green Paper on social housing; since then the world has gone Brexit crazy and little has been heard from central government on how they intend to proceed.The document itself quotes from the 1950s, a time when both major parties believed in the construction of council housing for rent. I have used the phrase “council housing” deliberately as it was at that time not synonymous with social housing.

Up until the 1970s council housing was not seen as a safety net but as an aspirational step up. It wasn’t stigmatised, but seen as a move up the ladder from poor-quality private rented accommodation. In fact, to get council housing, you normally had to be of good standing, in work and be able to pay the rent without assistance. That, however, changed, largely due to several apparently unconnected government decisions from the late ’70s and early ’80s which have led to the stigmatised view of social housing that exists today – not my words, but those of the prime minister.

A look at the statistics for the period from 1945 to 1979 show that this was the boom or golden era for building council housing. Much of that building was to replace stock damaged or destroyed by the Luftwaffe, but there was also much slum clearance. The quality of the replacement stock was variable, with much of the stock built in the 1950s and early 1960s being of good quality and is still in demand today. However, much of the stock built from the mid-1960s onwards was of lower quality and fits perhaps the more stereotypical image of council housing – high-rise, often system-built and poorly built and designed. Much is now the focus of regeneration schemes.

Since 1979, governments of both major parties have almost without exception turned their back on building new council housing. Both parties have, until very recently, almost actively encouraged councils to divest themselves of their stock to either housing associations or to arm’s length management organisations. Funding for new build has been virtually extinguished until recently and, in the light of that, the considerable expertise that councils had in council house building and delivery has virtually disappeared as the demand for those services has been eliminated.

The Green Paper and subsequent announcements from central government appear to be a step towards a small renaissance in council house building. So let’s make sure we learn from the golden era, to ensure the next generation of council housing doesn’t become the regeneration scheme of the 2060s. We should, I believe, look at the following: funding, place and people. In this piece I will only look at funding.

Although the system changed over time, virtually all council house building before 1979 had significant subsidy attached to it. This was in the days before the ring-fenced housing revenue account where any increase in costs of borrowing or running the stock would, if not met from rents, fall to the general rate payer i.e. the local tax payer. The subsidy was normally a revenue subsidy to reduce the cost of borrowing to the local council. It must be remembered that in those days the cost of a house was significantly less if inflated to current prices than a property is today, particularly in London and the South East.

In the present day, the subsidy available for social housing delivery is a cost per unit grant to reduce the capital cost,with the balance being met from borrowing or other resources. Most of the social housing currently produced is in effect a by-product of the planning system that tries to ensure that social or affordable rent housing is produced as part of private for-sale schemes, and again most of this housing is provided and managed by housing associations, not councils.

This is a far cry from the pre-1979 arrangement where councils brought forward their own schemes supported by central government subsidy. A return to those days is perhaps impractical but there are some steps that could be taken that would have minimal impact on wider government finances yet would prove the government is serious about encouraging councils to build a new generation of council housing for rent.

For councils the normal source of borrowing is the Public Works Loans Board (PWLB) which, in effect, is a loan from the government. One way of reducing the cost of housebuilding to councils would be to reduce the mark-up, or profit, that the government makes from lending to councils. Most councils borrowing at present from the PWLB would be paying the certainty rate of +80 basis points over gilts. One option would be for government to authorise the PWLB to reduce the mark-up for social housing to +40 basis points, a dispensation given once before as part o fthe HRA subsidy buy-out deal in 2012.

In high-cost areas of the country like London this would make some of the more marginal schemes deliverable. If government were serious about helping councils to deliver more social housing,this would be a very quick win.

The second step towards greater freedom is the use of right-to-buy (RTB) capital receipts. I won’t go into the rights and wrongs of RTB here as that’s the subject of a piece all by itself. However, on the acknowledgement that RTB in some form will remain, current restrictions on when councils can spend RTB receipts lead to potentially long-term decisions.

The current restriction of spend within three years of their receipt doesn’t reflect the reality of how long sites take to come to fruition – site assembly, design and procurement alone require an absolute minimum period of at least five years. And it goes without saying that 100% of receipts should be applied. I would add that I’m in favour of a restriction that RTB receipts should only be applied to new-build properties and not, as can happen at present, to acquisitions, many of which involve the buying back by the council of ex-RTB properties! This restriction would incentivise councils to look at building new units.

The third step is to create a more generous and less conditional grant regime. On this I speak from a London perspective, where the mayor and GLA control the purse strings rather than Homes England. At present in London the maximum grant available is £100,000 for a property which is on, or below the London affordable rent cap which is currently £158.84 per week for a two-bedroom unit. When this is translated into the cost of financing the debt, managing and maintaining a unit, it means a unit of accommodation particularly in inner London can only be built where the council owns the site and there is little need for demolition or buying out of other units. Where there are significant acquisition costs, this then makes social housing virtually impossible to deliver without either greater public subsidy or private subsidy, either through the planning system or through arrangements with the private sector, or building direct for sale. This to me is unsatisfactory – if the government is serious about austerity being over, then it should seriously look at increasing grant in high spend areas.

When talking about conditional grant, I am referring again to London where grant on regeneration schemes is conditional on a residents’ ballot. I would have thought following the Brexit ballot in 2016 that politicians would want to be very careful about having a single-issue vote as it sometimes finishes up with a perverse result! As an alternative, I would suggest that any grant should be conditional on those tenants and resident leaseholders displaced as part of a regeneration scheme having a guaranteed right to return and a single move policy.

My final point is for greater flexibility between the HRA and general fund. Ideally, I would like to see a return to the pre-1989 position of no HRA ring-fence, but realistically I know this will not happen. However, there is one area where greater flexibility would assist and that’s on the transfer, or appropriation of land between the two sides of the statutory ring-fence.

This land transfer is often necessary to facilitate regeneration or development. Under the rules as they stand at present any appropriation is required to transfer at market value, the impact of which can at times be to add additional costs to the HRA, which may make a build project less viable. Based on my experience, much of the land in question, particularly that held in the general fund, was initially acquired by the council well before the HRA ring-fence was established under the 1989 Local Government and Housing Act, and was often acquired initially under broad housing powers, such as slum clearance.

The council would then have undertaken a wholescale housing redevelopment which may have included the building of a facility such as a day nursery or old people’s home (that’s what they were called in the 1960s).

At that time there was no financial transaction required to reflect the differing uses of the site as both council housing and the other facilities were accounted for wholly in the general fund. That’s not the case now, though, but by enabling land to move freely from the general fund to the HRA without a technical finance transaction getting in the way, councils will avoid pre-ring-fence history scuppering a scheme’s overall viability.

Even if all four of these options were adopted they would, I accept, only impact the supply of council housing at the margins, but that’s a good start. What’s really needed is a significant boost in funding, a return to much more direct intervention by central government, moving the emphasis on housing support from personal support (welfare benefits) to the subsidy of bricks and mortar so that councils can build more housing that is affordable to rent.

To do that in the short term will mean an increase in overall expenditure, but unless this is done there is little hope of reducing the queues for social housing and curtailing demand for benefits. Building council houses is a true spend-to-save initiative – an old idea, but sometimes the old ones are the best ones.

Chris Buss is ex director of finance and deputy chief executive at London Borough of Wandsworth

Friday, June 15, 2018

"Councils face replacement property drought"

"Two-thirds of councils will be unable to replace all the homes sold under Right to Buy without significant reform of the system, according to the Local Government Association.

The LGA this week released research it commissioned from property consultancy Savills which showed that more than 60,000 homes have been sold off in the last six years at, on average, half the market rate. The sales leave councils with enough funding to build, or buy, just 14,000 replacement homes. The LGA is calling on the government to allow all councils to borrow for building new homes, keep 100% of all sales receipts, and have the power to set Right to Buy discounts locally. Martin Tett, LGA housing spokesman, said councils needed “urgent” support to replace the homes sold off under the Right to Buy scheme. “Without a pipeline of new homes, future generations cannot benefit from the scheme,” said Tett.

http://www.room151.co.uk/brief/#councils-face-replacement-property-drought

I thought the tories promised "like for like" replacement of Right to buy properties sold?

Monday, March 06, 2017

Newham ditches LOBOs pledging £94m in savings

This has been one of the most popular stories on the Local Government finance website Room 151 recently. By Colin Marrs. LOBOS is the Spanish name for wolf. 
"Newham Council has agreed a deal with Barclays to switch almost half of its Lender Option Borrower Option (LOBO) loans into fixed rate loans.
The council — which had the biggest LOBO portfolio of any council in the UK — has come under intense pressure from campaigners and featured prominently in a Channel 4 Dispatches programme last year which sought to highlight the cost of LOBOs to the public purse.
Room151 understands the council has now fixed the rate on £248m of its £563m portfolio, following lengthy negotiations between senior officials at the council and the bank.
Lester Hudson, cabinet member for finance, and commercial opportunities, said: “We took out these types of LOBOs as they represented the best deal for the council at the time and (they) have saved us millions of pounds in interest payments.
“They were part of our balanced and award winning strategy which includes a balanced approach to risk.
“As a council, and in line with good stewardship, we are always working to reduce the cost of our borrowing. We have taken independent legal and financial advice on this agreement and it is now the right time for us to restructure these loans.”
In a statement, Newham said it would save £94m in interest payments that it would otherwise have paid on the LOBOs over their remaining life.
This figure was reached by multiplying the current annual interest payments by 60 years — the average term length of the loans.
However, when approached by Room151, the council was unable to confirm the rate agreed on the new loan.
Last year, Barclays announced it would waive its lender option on its £5bn LOBO loan book with local authorities and reduce break costs. It is unclear whether the deal announced by Newham differs from the details in that announcement.
In Newham’s 2015/16 annual accounts, the fair value of the council’s LOBO portfolio was recorded as £1.3bn.
Newham councillor John Gray, who has been critical of the LOBO programme, welcomed the authority’s announcement.
He said: “Previously, the LOBOs skewed the council investment strategy because the council has to have bags of reserves available at each of the options dates.
“We had to have all this money on deposit, in case the bank decided to exercise its option to request a rise in the rate we pay.”
But he added that the “devil will be in the detail”, and questioned whether the renegotiated loans include “inverse” LOBOs, on which the council currently pays its highest rates.
Gray said: “We are asking councillors for further information but I suspect they will try to use commercial confidentiality to prevent us finding out more.”
Newham council said that the new deal would improve its credit position, reducing the cost of future borrowing.
“Moreover, it will further stabilise the council’s future debt costs helping to safeguard council tax from future increases and protecting council services,” it added"

Sunday, August 23, 2015

Newham Overview & Scrunity "Call in" on SPV - 6.30pm Monday 24 August 2015

Tomorrow evening at Committee Room 1, East Ham Town Hall, members of Newham Council Overview & Scrutiny will debate a request from a Cllr that up to £500,000 should not yet be spent on a proposed Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) for its staff pension fund.

Cllr Farah Nazeer has asked that this proposal should, firstly, get agreement from the Newham Investments & Accounts (I&A) Committee. She quite rightly points out that in a time of public spending cuts the Council should not be committing to this proposal until the I&A have made an informed decision to support further investigation into what is an expensive and potentially risky measure.

As far as I can make out the idea is that Newham will let its pension fund have some sort of control over a council owned asset in exchange for reduced employer contributions to the fund.  I have posted my concerns on this proposal here and here

There has been some interesting coverage in the Pension press. Professional Pensions have covered the story and there was a measured article on the use of such "alternative funding" in the Local Government Pension Scheme (LGPS). However, it points out that they are complex, expensive  and there are "key issues" (see below)


What are the key issues for schemes?
1) Valuation of the underlying properties. Would the administering authority invest in the assets if they were not held under this structure? Funds should also ask for the unoccupied value in addition to the current occupier value. If the employer becomes insolvent, the property will be unoccupied so that value will be relevant.
2) Conflicts of interest. Is the local authority in its capacity as administering authority of the pension fund acting solely in the interests of the pension fund and its members?
3) Ensure the arrangement doesn’t breach any regulatory requirements.


The model being proposed for Newham also seems to be very different than that used in the private sector.

In the private sector if the assumptions behind the SPV fail and go "belly up" then the pension trustees can sell the assets to make up the loss of contributions. With the Newham model this does not appear to happen and instead the Council will start to pay rent and maybe increase its contributions? Which makes me wonder - with regard to 2. above and "conflicts of interests". What is in the interests of the Newham pension fund to allow this to happen? 

Why would the fund agree to a potential minimum of 3 years of under-funding at a time of large pension deficits, massive cuts in government support and no Crown promise if the sponsor (i.e. the Council) goes bust?

Mind you, I have not had access to all the reports since Chief Officers are refusing to let me see them. Despite being an elected Councillor and a member of the Investment & Accounts Committee.

The website for Council Finance Officers "Room 151" also points out here that:-  

"The Pensions Regulator warned in 2013 that the use of such complex structures “can lead to increases in risk where advisers to schemes have not anticipated all the implications of using this structure”.

It added: “It is vital that trustees understand the risks they are taking and consider carefully whether a more complex approach to supporting the scheme, which may involve additional risk taking by the scheme, is preferable to a straightforward one.”. 

Tomorrow's meeting should result in more information coming out about the proposal but so far it seems to me that it is nothing more than a speculative bet that the fund will perform better than our advisers think it will.

The fund is already in deficit because for various reasons it has historically under-estimated how much money it needs. There will have to be extremely good reasons and proper scrutiny for the fund to risk any further mistakes with our staff's pensions.

Saturday, August 01, 2015

Showing LOBO salesmen the door

Another council insider, David Green, adds more on the website Room 151 to the sorry tale of the LOBO debacle after watching the recent Parliamentary Select Committee investigation.

He recalls as a former local authority treasury management officer, how the LOBO salesmen who pitched these toxic loans were sent away by his director "at the earliest opportunity".

David writes "Having worked for a local authority, a money broker and now an independent treasury adviser, I have seen LOBOs from many angles.  

I know that when our brokers and advisers visited me as a junior council treasury officer, the initial low interest rate looked superficially attractive.  But I also remember asking what I would be charged for a plain fixed rate loan from a bank, and on finding that it was much more expensive, I gained some idea of the value inherent in those options".

The most damning comment is towards the end 

"And in retrospect, I really can’t imagine a local authority treasurer asking for a loan whose rate stays fixed if market rates fall, but whose rate can rise when market rates increase, in what was called a lose-lose situation at the Committee".

Check out my previous posts on the LOBO scandal and most importantly - what can Councils and Housing associations do about it here, here and here.

(about picture - LOBO is Spanish for "Wolf". Quite an apt name I think) 

Tuesday, July 28, 2015

"LOBOs and the confessions of an ex-auditor"

Check out this article in the local government finance online site "Room 151". Former auditor, Stephen Sheen, looks critically at the decision making process that resulted in Councils taking out LOBOs (Lender Option; Borrower Option) in the first place.

He thinks that the arguments that LOBOs were better than PWLB (the government Public Works Lending Board) are "somewhat disingenuous". The big numbers thrown by critics do not "illuminate the evils inherent in LOBOs"  To be fair he seems to be not a great fan of any long term fixed rate loans.

He "fesses" up that as an auditor at the time there was little thought about whether "LOBOs had unlawfully sneaked Bermudan swaptions" back into Local Government finance (after I assume the Hammersmith & Fulham debacle).

The suspicion is that LOBOs appeared attractive since loans could be rolled over and spread for unprecedented time periods.  Also the initial "teaser" interest rates (some 0%) provided short term financial relief.

His final thoughts were that this is still relevant since "it is still the episode from my twenty-year audit career that I remember with most concern about the enduring question of the acceptance of advice without due critical reflection". So I think he means if it happened once, it could happen again.

This is the only commentory I have read in mainstream council media that "suggests" LOBOs were a bad deal for local authorities. Unlike the Housing Association world where it is widely accepted that LOBOs were a disaster, in Local Government, we still have our heads buried in the sands.

If you are in a hole, the first thing to so is to stop digging and get yourself out of the hole. Councils holding large amounts of LOBOs should accept that they have been mis-sold unlawful loans and then combine together (with housing associations) to sue the Banks and the advisers.

Otherwise we face spending billions of pounds that we haven't got on profits for the Banks paid for by further slashing and burning public services.

Can we start this by having some more confessions please. 

If you don't have a clue what I am talking about (not an uncommon occurrence) check this article http://grayee.blogspot.co.uk/2015/07/how-banks-are-ripping-off-councils-and.html

Hat tip Mr Meech.